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THE STATUS OF AN ATTORNEY DEFENDING A
GUILTY CLIENT.
Mr. William Navis was unquestionably right when he said:
"It is one of the worst of errors to suppose that there is any
path of safety except that of duty." But what is our duty is
not always easy to determine. The complexity of the situ-
ation in which we are sometimes placed, makes it often difficult
to decide. It happens thus, that the status of the attorney to
his guilty client, is not infrequently a matter causing him much
perplexity.
Abraham Lincoln once replied to a client, after he had
stated his case to him, in the following language: "I can't
serve you, for you are wrong and the other fellow right. My
business is never to defend wrong. I never take a case that is
manifestly wrong." It is also reported of Sir Matthew Hale,
that in his early practice he made it his rule not to defend a
client that appeared to him to be guilty. This is the position
still taken by a number of prominent attorneys to-day.
But a somewhat careful examination of this subject will
clearly show that this is far from being the best attitude to
take. In fact, Sir Matthew Hale himself repudiated that posi-
tion in the later years of his practice. He realized, that refusing
to defend a client, simply because appearances seemed to indi-
cate that he was guilty, would be acting as judge of the case,
not as attorney.
It is an elementary principle of American Civics, that every
man has a right to be defended, no matter how guilty he may
be. The sixth amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly
states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, and, to have the assist-
ance of counsel for his defense." Most of the State constitu-
tions contain provisions to the same effect. The right of having
assistance of counsel includes also the right of consultation;
and also the right to have the attorney's advice and instruc-
tions on all matters pertaining to the prisoner's defense. (See
People v. Risely 13 Abb. N. C., (N. Y.) 186). Even in cases
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where the accused is a ]Iwyer himself, this right is enforced,and
the prisoner must be granted the privilege of securing efficient
assistance of counsel. (People v. Naphtaly, 105 Cal. 641; 39
Pac. 29.) In truth, so desirous is the law to enforce this con-
stitutional right, that in cases where the accused has not the
means to engage counsel, the court will appoint one for him,
and the attorney so appointed will not be permitted to refuse.
(See Kelley v. Andreu Co., 43 Mo., 338; Vise v. Hamilton
Co., 19 Ill., 18.)
Another well-established principle of law is, that every man
is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved.
"This presumption of innocence is so strong that even where
the guilt can be established only by proving a negative, that
negative must in most cases be proved bytheparty allegingthe
guilt; though the general rule of law devolves the burden of
proof on the party holding the affirmative. Thus, where the
plaintiff complains that the defendants, who had chartered the
ship, had put on board an article highly inflammable and dan-
gerous, without giving notice of its danger to the master or
others in charge of the ship, whereby the vessel was burned, he
was held bound to prove this negative averment." Greenleaf
on Bvidence, Vol. 1, p. 130, 16th edition. (Powell v. Milburn,
3 Wils. 355, 366; Rodwell v. Redge, 1 C. & P. 220.)
It is obvious then, from the above, that to refuse to take up
a cause, simply because the client appears to be guilty, would
be to pass "judgment on him and sentence him to a deprivation
of the legal services of his (the client's) chosen counsel, in
violation of his constitutional right to be regarded as innocent
until he has been proven guilty." With all due respect, there-
fore, to our immortal President, we do not think his attitude
a proper one to be followed by the legal profession.
It might be remarked, however, that an attorney not en-
gaged in the actual practice of criminal law may sometimes
properly decline to take up a criminal case; but generally
speaking, no lawyer, certainly no criminal lawyer, should de-
cline taking up a cause simply because a client appears to be
guilty. Section 13, Code of Ethics of the Alabama Bar Associa-
tion provides, that "An attorney cannot reject the defense of a
person accused of a criminal offence, because he knows or be-
lieves him to be guilty."
Taking up a defence, however, should never imply recourse
to what is known among the members of the Bar as "sharp
practice." A lawyer is-though in a limited sense-an officer of
26 YALE LAW JOURNAL.
the court. Hence it is his duty to help the administration of
law, not to hinder it. To defeat the ends of justice, is the work
of the pettifogger, not of the lawyer. Truly say Frank S. De-
neen, District Attorney at Chicago, Edwin M. Ashcraft, and F.
A. Johnson, in the disbarment case of in re-Picder, at the con-
clusion of their brief: "He (meaning the lawyer) was the
friend, assistant, and officer of the court, before he was the
attorney of this client, and that, as such otfcer, it is his first
sworn dutyto honestly and earnestly labor to render aid to the
court, to arrive at the correct conclusion upon the facts of the
law." It follows therefore, as a logical corollary from the above,
that under no circumstances has a lawyer the right to herald
honest people as perjurers, make use of equivocal terminol-
ogy, intimidate witnesses, manufacture alibis, or tell lies, sim-
ply because, by doing so, he would advance the interests of his
client.
It is certainly true that a lawyer is only bound to present
one side of the case. But in doing that, he must not use unfair
or unlawful means. Once retained, he is bound to exert all his
industry in defending his client, no matter how guilty he
may be; but the arguments used must be truthful and in ac-
cordance with the evidence in the case. As long as he does not
go outside of the evidence, he may give his client the benefit of
all fair advantages. In fact, we would say that he should do
so, because a lawyer should always exercise the best of his abil-
ity. Our courts recognize this, and have therefore held that
our Constitution, by implication, guarantees to the counsel of
the accused independence in his entire management of the case,
and in his examination of witnesses and his comments and ar-
guments. (See Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 443, and
the cases cited byhim.) In order also that the attorney should
be able to fully serve his client, our Supreme Court, in the case
of Central Trust Company v. Milwaukee Street Railway Com-
pany, 74 Fed. 442, has held, that a lawyer is not subject to
service of process while attending court in the interest of a
client. For the same reason, too, most of the states have made
enactments exempting attorneys from service as jurors.
In applying himself to the protection and defence of his
client, he may also do things for him which he would not do
for himself. Thus, to enforce certain obligations or to avail
himself of certain advantages, may sometimes be a little con-
trary to his own feelings, but if the law requires it and his
client insists on it, he must do his duty as a lawyer. Were it
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his own case he might make some concessions or waive certain
advantages, but in his client's case he has no right to
make any such concessions or abjure any such advantages.
And although it may be from truly moral principles that he is-
disposed to give those rights away, he dare not do so, because
they are not his. He is the custodian of his client's rights, the
guardian of his interests. Furthermore, his duty is not only
to exercise integrity, care and diligence, but also skill. In fact,
so much latitude is given to the attorney, in the exercise of his
tact, that if necessary to his defence, he may use defamatory
words about parties on the other side; provided, of course,
there is proper cause. His conduct is certainly always subject
to the ordinary rules of propriety. An attorney will never be
allowed to abuse the character of a private person wantonly
or maliciously. (See Munster v. Lamb, 11 Q. B. Div., 588;
Woody. Gunston, Styles 462.) Words expressive of hard and
bitter feelings are also sometimes unbecoming to the dignity
of the court; hence cases may frequently arise where the use of
defamatory words will be repressed. But where there are
good grounds and it is necessary to a client's defence, defama.
tory words may justly be used. (See Mower v. Watson, 11
Vt. 356; Bradley v. Heath, 12 Pick. 163; Garr v. Selden, 4
N.Y. 91.
To recapitulate then, it may be stated that as a general
proposition no lawyer has a right to decline a case simply be-
cause the party seems to be guilty. No one can form an opin-
ion until he has heard all the facts of the case. Furthermore,
judging is not the function of the lawyer. The lawyer's duty
is to present his side of the case to the best of his ability. On
the other hand, no lawyer should ever tarnish his honor for
any client. Under no consideration should he ever resort to
any unlawful means. His conscience should never be for sale.
The lawyer should be the best type of man; and honesty and
honor should ever be his guide.
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